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This paper discusses the impact that so-called common goods might have 
in distributive social regimes. While questioning some of the most accepted 
notions of property rights, it suggests the philosophy of natural rights and of 
the bundle of rights to conceptualize it as a particular constellation of 
collective rights involving different agents, who shape a sort of fiduciary 
relationship. Common property thus understood appears as a way of 
fostering a pre-distributive regime in which the property rights of wealth 
and productive assets are designed for, and applied in the structural 
circumstances of the distribution itself, and not merely in response to the 
outputs of a unfair and unequal system of distribution. 
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Resumen:  
Este artículo discute el impacto que los llamados bienes comunes pueden 
tener en los regímenes de distribución social. Cuestionando algunas de las 
nociones más aceptadas de los derechos de propiedad, se sugieren la 
filosofía del derecho natural y del bundle of rights para conceptualizarlos 
como una constelación de derechos colectivos que implican a varios 
agentes que conforman una suerte de relación fiduciaria. La propiedad 
común entendida así aparece como un modo de fomentar un régimen pre-
distributivo en el que los derechos de propiedad de la riqueza y los activos 
productivos estén diseñados y aplicados sobre las circunstancias 
estructurales de la misma distribución, y no simplemente como respuesta a 
los resultados de un sistema de distribución injusto y desigual. 
Palabras clave:  
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Although common and collective property is not a new phenomenon, recently they 
have attracted significant attention. The debate between Garret Hardin (1968) and 
Elinor Ostrom (1990) revived the discussion while awakening the interest of different 
disciplines. Such attention may be explained by commons’ impact in different spheres 
of contemporary societies: in the technology and the Internet because the free software 
and new devices; in culture due to the rise of new intellectual property rights; in 
scientific research as a result of new patents; in the economy because of new 
collaborative practices. Nevertheless, the meaning of the term is probably confusing.2 
On the one hand, this might be because the juridical status of the commons has been 
overemphasized due to the emergence of new patents and property rights. On the 
other, because its current meaning usually overlooks the historical configuration of the 
commons in shaping multiple forms of political organization and mobilization.  
 
Hence, this paper works with a twofold interpretation of the commons, first as 
material or immaterial resources subjected to particular configuration of property 
rights and, second, as historically-framed political, ideological and economic 
practices which, accordingly, promote different regimes of self-governance, 
mobilization and multiple expressions of social conflict. Such a perspective, 
however, should give more attention to the effects of commons on productive and 
reproductive social structures and, specifically, how these kinds of resources would 
interpellate the realm of distributive justice. Should we include the common property 
regime when discussing distribution and justice issues? In considering this question, 
the paper addresses two main points. First, the study of what the so-called political 
                                                        
2 Commons, usually identified as natural resources collectively managed by peasants, are now 
divided among material (housing, infraestructure), immaterial (codes, patents), natural (water, 
environment, air), cultural (knowledge), global, and local dimensions. Efrat Eizenberg (2012) 
uses the term “actually existing commons” in referring to those goods not ruled by the state or 
markets but shared within urban areas. Charlotte Hess (2008) uses the term “new commons” for 
those related with culture, knowledge, markets, and global interests. The aim of this paper 
however, it is not to discuss its substantial definition, but its operational conceptualization to 
emphasize the dual dimension of the commons: the juridical (property rights) and the political 
(governance practices they entail). Elsewhere (Laín, 2015) it has been discussed the 
reasonability of drawing a comparison between the natural historical commons and the current 
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economy of the commons is. This categorization (though with different names) 
appears throughout history, from the medieval tradition until present-day scholars. In 
adopting this framework, the paper will present as a problem the most widely 
accepted meaning of property, which has tended to oversimplify the complexity and 
the scope of actual property rights. Second, by clarifying this issue, the paper 
explores the role of the commons (and of the associated property regimes) in 
redefining the logic of distributive justice. In doing so, it examines the so-called post-
distributive justice regime while proposing some advantages that a pre-distributive 
model based on the use of commons could provide.  
 
 
1. COMMON PROPERTY. A HISTORICAL APPROACH  
 
Under different labels and backed by distinct ideologies, what it might be called the 
political economy of the commons has existed at least since the fifteenth century. It 
was originally associated with the philosophy of jusnaturalism and natural rights, 
although during the late eighteenth century its religious character adopted a more 
secular and revolutionary viewpoint. The foundations of natural rights were 
expressed by Thomas Aquinas for whom, in extrema necessitate omnia sunt 
communia3, a position which was also taken up by Thomas Müntzer during the 
German Peasant Revolt in 1524, when he defended the small farmers’ right to retain 
common properties that secured their reproduction. During the sixteenth century, 
natural rights were progressively detached from a strictly theological interpretation as 
it adopted a more revolutionary and secular character. Still within a religious 
framework, however, the Dominican theologian Francisco de Vitoria provided a new 
framework in response to the context of colonialism and slavery. His lectures were 
enormously influential and innovative by shedding medieval mysticism. Following 
Justinian’s Digest (530–533 CE), he developed a crucial argument when sustaining 
that dominium did not mean ius. For Vitoria, as Tuck (1979) suggests, these Latin 
terms would contain two different ideas. Those who enjoy legitimate use or usufruct 
have a ius of a kind, but they are not domini, since 
 
If someone takes something from a usuary or a usufructuary or a 
possessor, that is described as a theft, and they are bound to restore it, but 
such people are not true domini; just as if I am the proprietor of a horse 
which I have hired to Peter, and I then take it from him, I am guilty of 
theft, (...) but it is not taken against the will of the proprietor, for I am the 
                                                        
3 “In cases of extreme necessity all things are common and, therefore, it does not seem a sin if one 
take a thing which belongs to another, because the necessity makes it common”, de Aquinas, 
(1999[1250?], II, II. §66, Art. 7: 549). 
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proprietor, but against his will who has legitimate possession of it.4  
Hence, the new philosophy influenced by the Spanish Salamanca School 
differentiated between ius, the positive right to use or usufruct, and dominium, the 
natural right to dispose of external things at will. This juristic turn (MacGilvray, 2011) 
recognised the need for positive restrictions on the natural dominium by including it 
in the ius civile.5 This shift was triggered by two contextual events. First it was a result 
of the colonisation of the Americas and enslavement of the Indians. It was Bartolomé 
de las Casas, along with Francisco de Vitoria, who famously declared that “all human 
races are one”, thus implying the inclusion of all individuals – Indians too – under the 
heading of human rights of freedom, happiness, self-defence and to set up 
governments by consent (Tierney, 2004). The second reason was the emergence of 
despotic and feudal powers and governments in Europe during the sixteenth century. 
Their unrestricted dominium over external things (land) and over people (slaves), was 
challenged by de las Casas: “Liberty is a right instilled in man from the beginning.6” 
With his new universalistic interpretation of natural rights, he embraced the medieval 
maxim, “what touches all is to be approved by all”. The logical consequence of this 
requirement was that Spanish laws could only be legitimate with the Indians’ 
consent. Moreover, it entailed a crucial political implication: where the natural right 
to liberty was concerned, the consent of a majority could not prejudice the rights of 
minority individuals withholding consent.7 So, the medieval idea of individual 
natural sovereignty came to acquire a collective dimension. It was by the end of the 
century when John Locke re-framed natural rights philosophy in political and 
economic terms. By criticising the absolute despotism of European monarchies and 
the Cromwellian government, he stated the need to “declare” natural rights and to 
subordinate to them all civil powers –individual, social, and governmental: 
 
To understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we 
must consider what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of 
perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and 
persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature; without 
asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.8 
                                                        
4  de Vitoria, Comentarios a la Secunda Secundae de Santo Tomas. Quoted by Tuck (1979: 47).  
 
5 MacGilvray refers to freedom and not to property although the “juridical turn” actually 
involves both concepts.  
 
6 Quoted by Tierney (2004: 11) 
 
7  Ibid. 
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Locke defended the idea that, within the state of nature, all men were equally free 
thanks to the right of appropriation (to dispose) of external goods since this determines 
their survival, their right of self-preservation. His new natural rights implied therefore 
the potestas or the individual’s right to his or her body and faculties, which meant a 
radical break from the medieval tradition in which God was the only sovereign of all 
goods and men. Hence, Locke’s political perspective can be seen as the philosophical 
background of the new human rights doctrines, including the right of existence and of 
the citizens’ sovereignty. His theory not only included the individual inalienable right 
to self-preservation, but also extended it to all humankind (II, §135), becoming a 
collective duty: “the state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obligates 
everyone” (II, §6). In the state of nature, he warned, “wherein all the power and 
jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another (…) should also be equal 
one amongst another without subordination or subjection.9” His theory, while 
defending private property as the means of securing the individual’s self-preservation 
and liberty, also embraced the same right for all humankind. As a result, the right of 
appropriation was not naturally unlimited. Rather, it had to be positively restricted. 
 
The Lockean conception of property rights and its fiduciary character nourished 
the philosophy of the American and the French revolutions. For example, it was 
Benjamin Franklin who stressed the need to protect the natural right of self-
preservation, saying that all property necessary to a man for its conservation is 
 
his natural Right, which none can justly deprive him of: But all Property 
superfluous to such purposes is the Property of the Publick, who, by their 
Laws, have created it, and who may therefore by other laws dispose of it, 
whenever the Welfare of the Publick shall demand such Disposition. He 
that does not like civil Society on these Terms let him retire and live 
among Savages. He can have no right to the benefits of Society, who will 
not pay his Club towards the Support of it.10 
Franklin’s theory should be included within this new natural rights view that 
embraced both individual and collective. Natural rights (life, liberty, self-
preservation, and the pursuit of happiness) were backed by the right of property that 
must ultimately be restricted in order to protect the natural rights of all. Thomas 
Jefferson emphasized the very same idea: property was not an unlimited right, since 
 
no individual has, of natural right, a separate property in an acre of land 




10 Letter to Robert Morris, December 25, 1783, in Smyth (1905-7: 375). 
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(…). By a universal law, indeed, whatever, whether fixed or movable, 
belongs to all men equally and in common. Stable ownership is the gift of 
social law, and is given late in the progress of society.11 
In other words, priority has to be given to the universal natural right (of existence) 
which civil laws must develop and apply. Individual property rights both in America 
and in France were thus provided by the positive translation of the natural rights, 
namely, the new American and French constitutions. In France, it was the 
Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen ratified in 1789, the juridical device 
which sought to define natural rights. Between 1789 and 1795, such a “positive 
translation” of natural right shaped the political scenario. It should be noted that the 
second article of the Déclaration clearly stated the main natural rights in revolution: 
“liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression.” Revolutionary property was 
thus defined as “inviolable and sacred right” of which “no one may be deprived” 
though it must be limited and “public necessity, legally determined, shall clearly 
demand it” (art.17). In this regard, Maximilien Robespierre provided a new genuinely 
revolutionary natural rights’ approach. Concerned about the catastrophic effects of 
grain and flour speculation of Turgot’s political economy in 1775, he designed a set 
of laws (and a moral conception) in order to restrict the unlimited freedom of 
property and commerce. He left no doubt as to where he stood in his commitment to 
the natural right of existence: 
 
What is the first object of society? It is to maintain the inviolable rights of 
man. What is the first of these rights? The right of exist. The first social law 
is thus that which guarantees to all society’s members the means of 
existence; all others are subordinated to it. Property was only instituted or 
guaranteed to cement it. It is in order to live that we have property in the 
first case. It is not true that property can ever be in opposition with men’s 
subsistence.12 
It is not the aim of this paper to scrutinize all the revolutionary legislation. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that both republican parties (the Jeffersonian-
democrats and the Jacobins) re-shaped the natural rights philosophy in accordance 
with their distinct contexts. Although Jefferson used the term “virtuous economy” and 
Robespierre embraced the idea of “popular political economy”, both were reasoning 
within the same framework: if inviolable natural right was to be the fundamental 
goal, then property right must be instituted in order to cement them, as Robespierre 
reclaimed. Property, thus, was interpreted as a fundamental institution supporting 
both individual and collective freedom, as well as happiness, self-preservation and 
                                                        
11 Letter to Isaac McPherson, August 13, 1813, in Appleby & Ball (1999: 579-80). 
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fulfilment. As means for securing these political values, property rights were 
theorized in multiple ways. In doing so, the new natural rights theory gave to political 
sovereignty and private property the same fiduciary character whereby individual’s 
(principal) possession of both rights was only delegated, not alienated, to the 
collective body (agent). Thus, private property under both the American and the 
French republican political economy was understood as a collective or social value, 
which must be restricted in order to ensure basic liberties and political values for all. 
 
 
2. FROM NATURAL RIGHTS TO “BUNDLE OF RIGHTS” 
 
The philosophy of natural rights and the different expressions of political economy of 
the commons were eclipsed by the emergence of proto-capitalist markets during the 
nineteenth century. Along with the new utilitarianism, the idea of common property 
was progressively abandoned. It was in 1765 when William Blackstone went back to 
the ancient understanding, defining property as “the sole and despotic dominion 
which one man claims and exercises over the external things in the word, in total 
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.13” This idea of the 
unlimited and exclusive dominium over external things remains as the most widely 
accepted definition of property. Moreover, it is tremendously influential in present-
day liberalism thanks to Friedrich Hayek (1973: 107) who understood property as 
those “ranges of objects over which only particular individuals are allowed to 
dispose and from the control of which all others are excluded”. Does this mean that, 
as soon as contemporary markets were consolidated, property rights were reduced to 
this “sole and despotic dominion”? It should be noted that this idea of “individual 
exclusiveness” does not reflect the current juridical forms of property rights either. 
 
It was during the 1980s that the work of Elinor Ostrom and the Bloomington School 
discredited this assumption. Jurists and economists within such a school of juridical 
realism adopted a conception of property as a bundle of rights (Johnson, 2007; Merrill 
and Smith, 2001; Schlager and Ostrom, 1992; Coriat, 2013). This approach introduced 
an innovative way of conceiving property, in which the set of property rights 
decompose and recompose themselves according to distinct contexts and power 
relationships. In opposition of Blackstone’s and Hayek’s assumption, the bundle of 
rights theory defends the idea that property rights are fragmented among the different 
agents involving certain resource. As Table 1 shows, property rights are spread out 
among four agents entitled with distinct rights. 
 
 
                                                        
13 Blackstone (1897[1765], Vol. II, Chap. I: 167). 
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Table 1. Bundle of Rights Associated with Positions 
 Owner Proprietor Claimant Authorized User 
Access and 
Withdrawal 
X X X X 
Management X X X  
Exclusion X X   
Alienation X    
Source: Schlager and Ostrom (1992: 252). 
 
As it is shown, although the owner covers all rights, it does not mean an absolute 
right, since his entitlements are always limited or restricted by the other agents’ rights. 
The table shows the complexity of present-day property rights, and makes it possible 
to explore how property regimes are composed and decomposed in accordance with 
the internal political distribution of agents’ rights. In this sense, as Ostrom (2000: 342) 
explains, common property is understood as that pertaining to a group of individuals 
who are 
 
considered to share communal property rights when they have formed an 
organization that exercises at least the collective-choice rights of 
management and exclusion in relationship to some defined resource 
system and the resource units produced by that system. (...) all communal 
groups have established some means of governing themselves in 
relationship to a resource. 
Hence, as suggested above, the notion of commons should be seen as having two 
different dimensions; first, as goods associated with a particular regime of rights 
(usually linked as two types, that of the owners who have the right of alienation, and 
that of the proprietors and users who do not) and, second, as socio-political dynamics 
of collective action as a means of governing in relation to a resource. Considered 
from this double angle, commons are also an expression of political reciprocity, 
which is to say that they entail a sort of fiduciary relationship between agent and 
principal, between owners and proprietors which could also be understood as a 
network of multiple political and economic checks and controls of the community 
over their agent, that is, the government or individual proprietors.  
 
 
3. COMMON PROPERTY AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE  
 
The next step is to inquire into the role of this common property in the debate about 
distributive justice. Does it has any relation with the distributive justice? In A Theory 
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the basic structure of societies. Thus justice is closely related with how constitutions, 
markets and private property shape life chances. In addition, inequalities are the 
result of these structures and institutions subjected to our choices and control which 
“favour certain starting places over others” (Chambers, 2012: 20). Among other 
important institutions (i.e. political constitutions or governments), the political 
configuration of property (its nature, scope, and its regime of rights) will ultimately 
determine the fairness of a particular scheme of distributive justice. Therefore, to 
inquire into a particular type of property rights is to inquire into the regime of 
distributive justice where some agents are “favoured over others.”  
 
As noted above, a higher or lower ranking of inequalities depends on a particular 
set of decisions affecting the disposition of social institutions among which, property 
and markets become the most important. It has been said that there are agents 
“favoured” in comparison with others so, when thinking about a fair regime of 
distributive justice one should be concerned about how to prevent the growing 
inequalities within economic institutions from affecting the political ones. So that, it 
is pertinent to inquire what would be the main features of a scheme of distribution 
based on common property, and what advantages would it present in comparison 
with a regime predominantly based on private property. The former regime is called 
pre-distributive, drawing attention to the role of social mechanisms in preventing 
adverse events from occurring at an early stage. In contrast, the latter could be 
dubbed post-distributive because its policies are carried out ex-post. 
 
3.1. Defining a Post-Distributive Regime 
 
The distributive regimes adopted by the majority of western economies have 
undergone great changes since the end of the Second World War. That historical 
conjuncture gave a “social and democratic” character to welfare regimes, where 
Rawls’ difference principle seems to be the normative justification: economic 
inequalities can be justified “if they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-
advantaged members of the society” (2001: 43). Rawls’ maximin principle was thus 
adopted as the normative foundation of distributive justice based on a taxes and 
benefits mechanism. The distributive policies were achieved by incorporating all 
economic actors (work, business, and capital) within a progressive tax design and by 
guaranteeing transfers and benefits in the form of – partial – universalistic social 
policies. However, insofar as neo-liberal workfare-oriented policies have become 
prominent, the collective character of welfare state has been replaced by a schema of 
increased targeting and conditionality in allocating benefits (Verbist et al., 2012). 
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In broad terms, collective-oriented social policies are being replaced by more 
individualistic capital transfer benefits. The state’s main redistributive role is 
consequently being reoriented, from a wider and more egalitarian distribution of 
access to the “labour” resource, to a wider distribution of capital assets promoting 
individuals’ opportunities to compete in the market by themselves. The president of 
Bundesbank, Jens Weidmann (2014), portrayed this transformation stating that the 
purpose of the labour market should be to protect the worker instead of the 
workplace.14 
 
These post-distributive regimes show some important limitations. If markets are 
currently understood as the main institutions through which re-distributive policies 
are designed and applied, it should also be noted that “Welfare-state capitalism (…) 
permits very large inequalities in the ownership of real property” (Rawls, 2001: 137). 
Consequently, the ex-post state’s mechanisms of re-distribution are activated only 
when market output in form of property has already been unequally (re)produced 
and distributed.15 Hence it can be observed how post-distributive regimes are first 
concerned to deal with widespread social equality through re-distribution of the 
market’s outputs and rewards (either as social policies or as capital assets).16 Rather 
than being concerned about causes – those conditions that have previously 
generated and meted out “large inequalities in the ownership” – the current role of 
the welfare state’s distribution seems to be coping with consequences. 
 
As a result, a second limitation of this regime emerges. Since welfare state 
capitalism promotes the increasing concentration of private property, “the control of 
the economy and much of political life rests in few hands” (Rawls, 2001: 138). The 
classical literature offers many examples of the causal relationship between the 
concentration of wealth and the oligarchic control of politics, however it was James 
Meade (1964: 39) who detailed the menaces of this correlation in a more 
contemporary language: 
 
A man with much property has great bargaining strength and a great sense 
of security, independence, and freedom and he enjoys these things not 
only vis-à-vis his propertyless fellow citizens but also vis-à-vis the public 
                                                        
14 It is very interesting to consider the differences between Weidmann’s claim and the 
International Labour Organization’s well-known principle ratified in the first annex of the 
Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944, declaring that “labour is not a commodity” (ILO, 1944). 
 
15 It is true that in the historical welfare states regimes public education and healthcare 
assistance had pre-distributive function. Nevertheless, by examining the current trends and 
their process of commodification, they are abandoning their pre-distributive character. 
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authorities. He can snap his fingers at those on whom he must rely for an 
income; for he can always live for a time on his capital. The propertyless 
man must continuously and without interruption acquire his income by 
working for an employer or by qualifying to receive it from a public 
authority. An unequal distribution of property means an unequal 
distribution of power and status even if it is prevented from causing too 
unequal a distribution of income. 
Needless to say, the concentration of both property and political influence Meade 
talks about is contrary to the widespread access to property rights, so that the 
fiduciary relation involving private and public property would be progressively 
eroded. From a juridical angle, a sort of historical constitutionalization of some 
fiduciary relationship concerning public and private properties can be observed. As 
long ago as 1225, The Charter of the Forest became one of the first expressions of 
such a relationship between principal and agent. Thus understood, it represents the 
Lockean juridical declaration of citizens’ (or principal) collective rights in restraining 
the property rights of use and, more important, of alienation of landlords and the 
crown (the agent). However, a brief look at more contemporary times also reveals 
multiple examples of private property rights being submitted to the sovereign’s law.17 
 
However, during recent years a “deconstitutionalization” of such rights has been 
taking place. Large private interests are currently purchasing the public assets of 
welfare states. Natural resources, productive assets, public debts and infrastructures are 
now undergoing privatization. As a result of this commodification of former public 
properties, the ownership rights of the sovereign – the citizens – are now jeopardized. 
What is happening is that, as the trustee is now more independent from the collective 
capacity for accountability and control, the redistribution of market outputs becomes 
much more difficult to equalize from the very start. Consequently, post-distributive 
policies are becoming more expensive and less effective in terms of reducing 
inequalities and poverty. At this point, it is worth thinking about the extent to which an 
economy with wider sectors of common property would be able to deal with both 
problems. 
 
3.2. Towards a Regime of Pre-Distributive Justice 
 
The pre-distributive regime is distinctive because its social distribution of wealth and 
capital is performed ex-ante, or before unequal market outputs have been generated 
and allocated. The idea “is not simply to assist those who lose out through accident 
or misfortune (although this must be done), but to put all citizens in a position to 
                                                        
17 Domènech (2004: 427). For a historical reconstruction of America’s republican and 
collective character of different types of property institutions, see: Simon (1991). 
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manage their own affairs and take part in social cooperation on a footing of mutual 
respect under appropriately equal conditions” (Rawls, 2001: 139). Accordingly, in 
this regime the institutions and mechanisms for redistributing wealth and productive 
resources are designed for, and applied in the structural circumstances (the causes) of 
the distribution itself, and not responding to the results (or consequences) of a 
formerly unequal and unfair distribution. A pre-distributive regime, thus, is concerned 
with those material and institutional conditions in which fair distribution has been 
carried out from the beginning. In this sense, and taking into account Meade’s 
concern (1975: 75) that “good and bad endowments of fortune are likely to reinforce 
each other”, a pre-distributive regime should be seen as a preventive device rather 
than as an attempt to remedy growing inequalities. 
 
There are other features of common property related with a fairer pre-distributive 
model. Firstly, the use of commons property would mean an expanding process of 
dicommodification of certain productive resources (i.e. natural goods or scientific 
knowledge). As current economic trends are reinforcing a sort of second enclosure 
movement (Boyle 2003), common properties could contribute towards mitigating the 
kinds of processes of dispossession and enclosures that are now threatening new forms 
of common property and the mechanisms of collective control over public and private 
property. By excluding some resources from markets, or by establishing certain market 
boundaries, it could be a way of democratizing their management and allocation. This 
achieved, a more thoroughgoing democratic control over such “commodities” would 
probably reinforce fairer and more equal distribution of their outputs, which would 
then tend to consolidate the pre-distributive character of such an economy. 
 
Secondly, by excluding some of these resources from markets, common property 
would also contribute towards dicommodifying the labour force (Wright, 2006) by 
eroding the relationship of dependency between wages and existence, or income 
and citizenship. In this regard, such a capacity of common or social properties would 
“operate as restraints on the commodification and capitalization of relationships (…). 
They thus encourage the owner to view her interest as a stake in a particular long-
term relationship” (Simon, 1991: 1341). Needless to say, the labour market has 
become the fundamental mechanism by which certain rights are conceded and 
social benefits allocated so that, to a great extent, citizenship is constructed through 
its economic and political inclusion into labour market. In other words, social 
reciprocity only makes sense when it occurs within, or as a result of participation in 
the labour market structure. Needless to say, social reciprocity could be a fair 
mechanism in a context of full employment, wage equalization and fair social 
benefits in return. Nevertheless, given the increasing influence of the participation in 
the labour market as a condition for entitlement to certain social benefits, and the 
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reciprocity is more likely to be a mechanism that perpetuates and reproduces current 
social inequalities (between migrant and national work force, breadwinner and 
housewife, or in a nutshell, between insiders and outsiders).  
 
There is a third kind of advantage that common property would foster. As it has 
been pointed out, less inclusive political institutions and more powerful economic 
agents would tend to erode common property and the fiduciary relationship it entails, 
so that the principal becomes less capable of controlling and subordinating its trustee 
or agent. If we understand economic inequalities as the result of power imbalances 
within both economic and political institutions, it follows that the bargaining power of 
waged people and the propertyless is now decreasing. On the other hand, the 
expansion of different pools of common property could reinforce what Philip Pettit 
calls the eyeball test that particular social position in which one is able “to look one 
another in the eyes without reason for fear or deference” (Pettit, 2014: 82). So, if 
common resources were better distributed and able to dicommodify important market 
sectors, then they could be seen as a pool of resources partially sustaining the material 
existence of citizens. As Pettit also suggests (2006:139), “If the property system or 
distribution has the contingent effect of allowing domination, then that makes a case 
for institutional adjustment”. 
 
Common resources could become this useful “institutional arrangement” to restrict 
the asymmetrical power relationships which have come to prevail in civil life and, in 
particular, in the productive sphere as a result of property concentration. In short, 
common property, by guaranteeing a partial material existence, could contribute to 
increase the bargaining power of less-favoured individuals so that asymmetrical 
relationships and arbitrary interference by some people in the others’ lives would tend 
to decrease. Some authors have seen this kind of material support and the consequent 
boost to bargaining power as a tool to guarantee one’s right to say no (Casassas, 2013; 
Widerquist, 2013) or to secure the possibility of exit (Hirschman, 1970), and thus 
contributing in democratizing markets and productive private spheres of civil life. 
 
According to this dicommodification and democratisation capacity, there is a last 
feature of common property. Larger common property pools could contribute towards 
securing the already suggested preventive capacity of redistributive regimes. Since 
common property would tend to “widespread ownership of productive property and 
limit the concentration of property over time”, it would also entail “some sort of once 
and for all redistribution of property holding, accompanied by institutional reforms (…) 
to keep the redistributed property from becoming reconcentrated” (Krouse and 
MacPherson, 1988: 99, 103). Characterized by a particular configuration of the bundle 
of rights including different agents with their associated rights, common resources 
(either material or immaterial) will consequently promote relatively large degrees of 
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juridical, spatial and temporal dispersion of property. Productive and reproductive 
resources, and therefore their outputs and benefits, are widespread ex-ante so the 
state’s distribution mechanism does not need to be employed each time but 
beforehand. Thus, common property could mitigate rising social expenditures by 
bringing about fairer distribution from the start and thus contributing to implement a 
more efficient social policy agenda.  
 
 
4. DISCUSSION  
 
As this paper attempts to explain, distributive justice based on use of the commons is 
highly relevant because of two factors. First, a more democratic and participative 
political life would require a more democratic and participative economic regime. In 
this sense, common property, by setting up a particular bundle of rights entailing 
multiple agents into the management and control of resources through the 
reinforcement of political fiduciary relationships, could contribute towards 
democratizing economic activity and, consequently, the political sphere. The basic 
idea is that the property of most resources and assets would be better understood as a 
particular constellation of collective rights. For the historical perspective explained 
above, private property would then become a private appropriation of a resource by 
means of a public fideicommissum, shaped by a fiduciary relationship between the 
principal (the sovereign, the people who retains the right of alienation) and the agent 
(the state and the markets who manage the resource). To a great extent, therefore, the 
private owner would be merely a trustee of public or sovereign property. 
 
Second, as Ostrom suggests common property is linked with governmental and 
political practices or, as Peter Linebaugh (2010) suggests, there is no commons without 
“commoning”. Moreover, a glance at the history of collective property and the normative 
arguments in favour of restrictions over individual property rights shows that common 
property has been understood not just as a mere economic end, but also as a means of 
achieving certain normative political aspirations. Accordingly, common property should 
be analysed from two different angles, namely from both juridical and political 
perspectives. The assumption that a pre-distributive regime based on common property is 
superior to a post-distributive model does not spring from a desire to find out a 
contemporary natural rights theory. Rather, it is based on the fact that for former regime, 
the common property fosters and entails practices of participation and political control 
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